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INC: DOMAIN BASED HSTS (HTTP STRICT TRANSPORT SECURITY) MANAGEMENT

Domain based HSTS (HTTP Strict Transport
Security) Management

Overview
HTTP-based APIs, including websites hosting web content, want to force HTTPS for security;
however, the current mechanism is not absolute in its intentions and requires third-party
configuration to help enforce the policy. On top of that, the configuration is very coarse grained
and does not meet many use cases where fine grained control is required, such as having
different policies for sub-domains of a second-level domain.
By allowing web domains to host their own configuration, we can give fine grained control to the
owners of domains and help to secure the web from malicious actors.

Problems Solved
The migration from HTTP to HTTPS across the industry has been slow to progress and the lack
of forced HTTPS leads to Man in The Middle (MITM) attacks, but API and Website providers
have an option to set a HTTP header called Strict-Transport-Security to tell browsers that all
connections must use HTTPS. The shortcoming is that the first connection could be intercepted
via MITM and result in a browser not receiving HSTS.

Prior Solutions
As noted, the Strict-Transport-Security header can be used to tell browsers that all connections
should use HTTPS. Additional details on suggested configurations are found in [8] and [9]. Even
with these configurations, however, “there’s a small window where a user visiting the site can
still be subject to a MITM attack.” [9] There are already several known exploits available to
bypass HSTS. [10][11]
To combat this a preload service has been built that is maintained by Google. [1][2] Preloading
a domain through this service will result in the domain being “hardcoded into Chrome as being
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HTTPS only.” [3] However setting this up for subdomains is prohibited as it is expected to be
done at the second level domain. [4] If an entire domain is not able to support HSTS due to not
being able to redirect from port 80 to 443 directly or if there are for instance multiple redirects [5]
then the domain cannot be added. Additionally, and specific to this disclosure a subdomain
would not then be able to use preload and could not therefore increase the security of a service
running on a subdomain. Further there needs to be a header set at the top-level domain which
often cannot be done by the owner of a subdomain.

Description
Describe the invention including any novelty and detectability.
Browsers could be made to check a service or endpoint running at the top-level domain by
default and companies could self manage the list of subdomains included in the preload list. For
example, when a call is made to sub.example.com or sub2.sub1.example.com the first
connection the browser would make would be to https://example.com/.wellknown/hsts.txt and what would be returned would be a list via Transport Layer Security
(TLS) of all subdomains that are required to be connected via HTTPS only. The requirement to
prevent MITM attacks would be that this connection must be made using HTTPS and have a
valid CA issued TLS certificate that can be verified. In this way, domain owners would not need
to presubmit their domains to a preloading service such as the one hosted by Google, but rather
could self manage. Further subdomains could be added at will and not suffer increased lag
times should the need arise to remove them from the list since the current model can take 6-12
weeks to have a domain removed.[6]
Client libraries that are used outside of a browser environment could be modified to support the
same functionality in a way that did not require the collaboration of browser vendors but would
function in a similar manner where the http client library would make calls to the Second Level
Domain (SLD) and check for a service to indicate which subdomains would require HTTPS for
all connections prior to beginning to negotiate traffic.
To implement the ideas in this disclosure, the process could build upon current standards
already in place and perhaps create a new one. For example, there is already wide adoption of
the robots.txt standard to indicate to web crawlers where to look in your website for
searchable pages. The ideas in this disclosure could use the same data formats in
robots.txt to help speed adoption. Another example is the “well known” [7] endpoints where
the ideas in this disclosure could be standardized to be available as a well-known endpoint.
With these standards, the ideas in this disclosure could be standardized in the IETF or some
other appropriate governing body.
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Figure 1: Example flow for HSTS instructions enforcement

Advantages
Detail the advantages of the disclosure
See above.
This innovation could be applied to devices, e.g., MFP printers, in the firmware to have tighter
control over secure connections. This would help our customers using these devices, especially
commercial, who want to ensure their data to/from the printer is always encrypted, i.e., between
cloud storage. Customers could choose to deploy this service internally to their network as
supported by hp devices and maintain control individually without outside collaboration on their
network.
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